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After  the  collapse  of  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  in  1980,  alternative  regimes  were 
adopted in Turkey. The “crawling peg” regime (1980-81) is followed by “managed float” 
(1981-99),  “crawling  peg”  (1999-2001)  and  “free  floating”  (2001-)  in  “de  jure” 
classification. This paper examines the behavior of the macroeconomic variables in terms of 
volatility across exchange rate regimes in “de jure “ and “de facto” classifications, using 
monthly  data  over  the  period  1980-2006.  We  find  a  strong  GARCH  effect  for  the  real 
exchange rate, inflation and foreign exchange reserves. The findings of the t-test indicate that 
the  variations  in  the  mean  of  most  of  the  macroeconomic  variables  are  not  statistically 
different  from  each  other under “de facto” regimes The results of this study suggest the 
existence of “de facto” regime neutrality.  
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The recent major emerging market financial crises posed serious challenges for 
policy  makers  in  the  setting  of  exchange  rate  regimes.
1  The  “bipolar”  view  of 
exchange  rates,  indicating  that  intermediate  regimes  are  not  sustainable  (Fisher, 
2001) and crisis-prone (see Summers, 2000; Edwards, 2001; Bubula and Otker-
Robe, 2003; Husain et al., 2005), is supported in all of these financial crisis.
2 This 
idea  is  primarily  associated  with  the  impossible  trinity  since  pegs  cannot  be 
maintained under high capital mobility and independent monetary policy. Therefore, 
flexible exchange regimes must be implemented. Proponents of pegged regimes, 
however,  argue  that  this  system  promotes  financial  stability  and  reduces  the 
likelihood  of  banking  crises  (Domaç  and  Peria  2000).  Both  fixed  and  flexible 
exchange  rate  regimes,  on  the  other  hand  may  also  trigger  financial  fragility 
(Grauwe and Grimaldi 2002). Hence, there is no real consensus about the choice of 
exchange rate regimes. As Frankel (1999) states that “no single currency regime is 
best for all countries and that even for a given country it may be that no single 
currency regime is best for all time.” 
It is believed that the choice of exchange rate regime might have contributed to 
macroeconomic instability and conversely, a shift in exchange rate regime might 
have improved macroeconomic performance. The behavior of the macroeconomic 
variables  across  exchange  rate  regimes  appears  to  be  a  significant  puzzle  in 
international macroeconomic literature. In this context, the contributions that can be 
established  from  an  empirical  analysis  are  highly  relevant.  The  issue  of 
macroeconomic volatility and exchange rate regime choice is particularly important 
for the financially vulnerable countries that frequently switch from one regime to 
another. While many developing countries have moved to a flexible exchange rate 
regime within the last three decades, it is surprising that there are only few studies 
that  analyze  the  relationship  between  exchange  rate  regimes  and  volatility  of 
macroeconomic variables.  
                                                            
1 The countries faced with crises, Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), Argentina 
(2001)  and  Turkey  (2001),  adopted  currency/basket  pegs  or  tightly-managed  exchange  rate  regime 
before crises. 
2 Intermediate regimes, or soft pegs, cover the regimes between super-fixed or hard pegs (currency 
union, currency board and dollarization) and floating (managed float and independently floating). These 
regimes consist of forward/backward looking crawling pegs/bands, horizontal bands, conventional fixed 
pegs and tightly-managed float (Fisher, 2001; Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2003).  
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The aim of this study is to add relatively small stock of evidence on the literature 
in the context of a developing country by investigating whether changes in time-
varying volatility of a set of macroeconomic variables can be attributed to changes 
in exchange rate regimes in Turkey under “de jure” and “de facto” classifications.  
The contribution of this paper is three-fold: First, although several studies have 
investigated the volatility of macroeconomic and/or financial variables for Turkey, 
none of them have examined the impact of exchange rate regimes on the volatility of 
macroeconomic variables.
3 To the authors’ best knowledge, this will be the first 
study analyzing the relationship between the volatility of macroeconomic variables 
and exchange rate regimes for Turkey. Second, it would be interesting to investigate 
how fundamental variables differ in terms of volatility under alternative exchange 
rate regimes since Turkey has adopted several different exchange rate regimes in the 
last two decades. Considering “de jure” and “de facto” classifications implies the 
deviation of commitment from actual behavior. Table 1 presents “de jure” and “de 
facto” classifications of exchange rate regimes.
4 
Table 1 
“De Jure” and “De Facto” Exchange Rate Regime Classifications: 1980-2006  
De Jure Regimes  De Facto Regimes 
01.01.1980-30.04.1981  Crawling band  01.01.1980-31.03.1981  Crawling peg 
01.05.1981-30.11.1999  Managed float  01.04.1981–28.01.1998  Managed float 
01.12.1999-16.02.2001  Crawling peg  02.02.1998–31.12.1998  Crawling peg  
around DM 
19.02.2001-  Free float  04.01.1999–31.01.2001  Crawling peg  
around € 
    01.02.2001–  Free float 
 
Finally, the results of this study may provide some important implications for 
policymakers.  If  macroeconomic  volatilities  are  found  to  be  the  same  under 
different exchange rate regimes (regime neutrality) and if the government aims at 
stabilizing the fundamental variables, a switch of the exchange rate regime appears 
                                                            
3 Some of these studies cover the exchange rate volatility (Selçuk, 2004); interest rate volatility (Aydın 
and  Özcan,  2005);  output  volatility  (Berument  and  Paşaoğulları,  2003);  the  relationship  between 
exchange  rate  volatility  and  stock  market  volatility  (Salman  and  Salih,  1999;  Kasman,  2006);  the 
relationship between volatility of exchange rate/parity and foreign trade (Doğanlar 2002, Vergil 2002, 
Kasman and Kasman, 2005; Kahyaoğlu and Utkulu, 2006). 
4 “De jure” classification is based on the monetary authority’s policy statement or formal commitment 
on the exchange rate regime policy. “De facto” approach is simply the actual or observable behavior 
since  countries  may  not  choose  to  commit  or  float  and  therefore  not  to  announce.  “De  facto” 
classifications are taken from (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2002). They develop “exchange rate flexibility 
indices”,  ) 1 % ( / < ε ε P ,  to  determine  the  degree  of  exchange  rate  flexibility  under  free  float  and 
managed float regimes. In their study, the data ends in October 2001. We extended this period until 
April 2006, since there is no recent regime change in the Turkish economy.  
 
 




5 If, however those volatilities are quite different across exchange 
rate regimes, these empirical results can serve as a guide for the effects of such a 
change and policymakers may take appropriate policy actions to reduce the risk of 
exchange rate regime shifts on macroeconomic volatility. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the literature 
review.  Section  3  presents  the  history  of  exchange  rate  management, 
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms in the Turkish economy. Section 4 
gives the dataset. Section 5 explains the conditional volatility models and reports the 
empirical  results.  Section  6  analyzes  the  relationship  between  the  volatility  of 
macroeconomic variables and exchange rate regimes. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Since the work of Mundell (1961), a vast literature has developed to examine the 
link  between  exchange  rate  regimes  and  macroeconomic  performance.  On  the 
theoretical front, in the stochastic IS-LM model Weber (1981), Turnovsky (1976) 
argue that the effect of exchange rate regimes on the macroeconomic performance 
depends on following two conditions: first, the types of shocks (domestic or foreign) 
that the domestic economy usually faces and the second, international mobility of 
capital that country has. If country has free mobility of capital and the exchange rate 
is flexible, then domestic-sourced LM type shocks will create large fluctuations in 
output,  inflation  and  the  exchange  rate.  If,  however,  exchange  rate  is  fixed  and 
capital is mobile, then LM shocks will have no effect on output or inflation. In 
contrast, a foreign-sourced shock will have larger affects on the domestic economy 
if the exchange rate is fixed.   
More recently, some models, Mundell-Fleming-Dornbush model and new open 
economy macroeconomics initiated by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), examine the 
question of how the exchange rate regime affects the international trade. The general 
argument is that exchange rates (both nominal and real) will be more variable under 
flexible then under fixed exchange rates and this volatility will be harmful to trade.
6 
These  theoretical  arguments  do  not  reach  a  clear  conclusion  concerning  the 
superiority of exchange rate regimes that will reduce the real volatility.  
                                                            
5 Monetary authorities change exchange rate policies not only for the macroeconomic stability, but also 
to break inflation inertia, to promote export, to realize integration in both its capital and current account 
transactions with another or a group of other economies and to gain credibility. A serious speculative 
attack may also force the abandonment of a pegged regime or a sharp depreciation in a free floating 
regime. 
6 For detail of the theoretical literature, see Bastourre and Carrera (2004).  
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Reflecting the theoretical debate, the extensive empirical literature does not seem 
to  come  to  any  conclusion  about  the  link  between  exchange  rate  regimes  and 
macroeconomic  volatility.  The  earlier  empirical  studies,  however,  support  the 
“regime neutrality” view, indicating that there is no substantial relationship between 
exchange rate regimes and volatility of the macroeconomic variables. Baxter and 
Stockman  (1989)  initiated  the  empirical  relation  between  a  number  of  real 
macroeconomic  variables,  industrial  production,  consumption,  government 
consumption,  exports,  real  exchange  rate  and  exchange  rate  regimes.  By  using 
descriptive statistics and F-test for the quarterly dataset of 23 OECD and 21 non-
OECD  countries  over  the  period  1960-1985,  they  found  evidence  on  regime 
neutrality  with  the  exception  of  the  real  exchange  rate  volatility.  Moreover,  the 
volatility of exports, imports and the real exchange rate was generally higher during 
the  recent  float.  Similarly,  Flood  and  Rose  (1995)  investigated  the  time  series 
behavior  of  monthly  nominal  bilateral  exchange  rates  (against  US$)  and 
macroeconomic  fundamentals,  industrial  production,  M1,  consumer  price  index,    
3-month treasury bill returns, in OECD countries over the period 1960-1991. They 
found that only the volatility of virtual fundamentals (nominal exchange rate and 
interest rate) was significantly higher during the post-Bretton Woods, whereas the 
volatility of traditional fundamentals was unchanged across exchange rate regimes.  
Dedola  and  Leduc  (1999),  using  descriptive  statistics  and  impulse-response 
functions and data from G-7 countries, found that the volatility of inflation, output, 
consumption,  investment  and  labor  did  not  appear  to  be  significantly  different 
across exchange rate regimes. However, the volatility of real and nominal exchange 
rates was higher after the collapse of Bretton Woods of fixed exchange rates. Singh 
(2002)  employed  GARCH  model  and  quarterly  weighted  and  unweighted  real 
exchange rates for the period 1975:02-1996:03 and 1960: 01-1996:03, respectively. 
He  added  evidence  on  regime  neutrality  in  the  context  of  India.  By  using 
nonparametric  tests  and  quarterly  data  of  the  nominal  exchange  rates  of  17 
European Monetary System (EMS) countries, Sopraseuth (2003) found that EMS 
caused a significant reduction in the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates 
(against DM) with the exception of Italy. But, the volatility of nominal exchange 
rates  (against  US$)  in  all  countries,  except  Finland  and  Sweden,  was  not 
significantly  different  across  exchange  rate  regimes.  Moreover,  the  volatility  of 
GDP,  consumption,  investment,  net  exports  to  GDP  in  these  countries  did  not 
systematically depend on exchange rate regimes.  
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Some of the other studies in the empirical literature argue the non-neutrality of 
regimes. By using Stable Paretian Distributions and Chi-squared test and weekly 
data for five developed countries, Westerfield (1977) found that the variability of 
floating  spot  and  forward  exchange  rates  are  higher  than  fixed  rates  during  the 
period  of  January  4,  1962-July  24,  1975.  Mussa  (1986)  employed  descriptive 
statistics and concluded that over the period 1957-1984, the short-term variability of 
bilateral  real  exchange  rates  (against  US$)  for  15  industrial  countries  was  on 
average 14 times higher under floating exchange rate regime than fixed. Conversely, 
Basu  and  Taylor  (1999)  investigated  the  co-movements  and  conclude  that  the 
volatility of consumption, current account, output and investment in 15 countries 
was relatively low after the collapse of Bretton Woods. Rose (1994) utilized the 
flexible-price model and single-factor exchange rate model and concludes that the 
quarterly data of virtual fundamentals (the bilateral exchange rates against DM and 
interest rates) for 8 industrial countries were more volatile after the Bretton Woods. 
Ghosh et al. (1997) used regression analysis and annual data for 136 countries over 
the period 1960-1990. They argued that pegged regimes appear with substantially 
lower volatility of inflation and higher volatility of output growth and employment.  
Kent  and  Naja  (1998)  used  non-parametric  tests  and  monthly  data  for  90 
countries over the period 1978-1994. They found that the short-term volatility of 
bilateral and effective real exchange rates was 12 and 3 times greater during the 
post-Bretton  Woods  period,  respectively.  However,  the  short-term  volatility  of 
effective real exchange rates among 27 countries, with stable inflation and growth 
rates, was only 2 times greater under floating regime. By using unit root testing and 
GARCH  model  and  two  different  dataset,  annual  data  from  1880  to  1997  and 
monthly  data  from  1957  to  1997,  Liang  (1998)  found  that  the  volatility of real 
exchange rates was higher after the Bretton Woods. Monacelli (1999), by using 
descriptive statistics and impulse-response functions for the quarterly data of the 
DM/US$ real and nominal exchange rates over the period 1960-1997, concluded 
that the volatility of real exchange rate was on average 4 times higher during the 
floating regime.  
Kwan  and  Lui  (1999)  used  the  structural  vector  autoregressive  model  and 
quarterly  data  for  the  period  1973-1997.  They  found  that  nearly  70%  of  the 
reduction  in  the  volatility  of  real  per  capita  GDP  and  GDP  deflator  might  be 
explained by the currency board in Hong Kong. They also concluded that demand 
shocks led higher short-term volatility in real per capita GDP during the adoption of  
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currency  board.  Similarly,  Ran  (2002)  argued  that  out  of  19  real  and  nominal 
variables,  12  exhibited  more  volatility  under  floating  regime  in  Hong  Kong,  by 
using two-tailed F-test. Carrera and Vuletin (2002) used GMM methodology for 
dynamic panel data approach and data from 93 countries, 21 OECD and 72 non-
OECD countries, over the period 1980-1999. They found a positive relationship 
between the flexibility of exchange rate regimes and the real exchange rate volatility 
and also argued that fix and intermediate regimes caused higher volatility under de 
jure classification. Finally, by using a dynamic panel data approach and data from 
two sample groups, 45 and 153 countries, Bastourre and Carrera (2004) argued that 
output volatility was lower during the recent floating period. De jure fixed regimes 
had greater volatility than de facto fixed regimes, whereas de jure and de facto 
flexible regimes showed similar volatility behavior. 
3.  Exchange  Rate  Management  and  Major  Policy  Changes  in  the  Turkish 
Economy: 1980-2006 
In this section, we provide a broad overview of the exchange rate regimes in the 
context of macroeconomic and structural policy framework in the Turkish economy 
for the 1980-2006 period. In line with the aim of this paper, we mainly focus on the 
exchange rate regime management.  
January 1980-May 1981: Crawling Band 
On January 24, 1980 a structural adjustment and stabilization programme was 
launched designed to encourage an export-oriented and liberalized economy. The 
priority of the program was disinflation, fiscal discipline and sustainable growth. 
Hence, the policy action taken by government included tight monetary and fiscal 
policy,  external  debt  management  policies,  incentives  to  promote  export  and 
reforms to improve the efficiency of public enterprises and to encourage private 
capital  formation.  Moreover,  this  programme  aimed  to  achieve  liberalization  in 
exchange and payment systems. The main objective was to make the Turkish Lira 
(TL) convertible. Since this period is associated with the balance of payments crisis 
and triple digit inflation, exchange rate regime changed fundemantally.
7 A realistic 
and flexible exchange rate regime was implemented to offset inflation differentials 
and to make Turkish exports more competitive. After a steep devaluation, 33%, in 
January 1980 frequent devaluations followed until May 1981. Gradual depreciation 
of TL was one of the essentials to promote export-led growth strategy. Over the 
                                                            
7 The rate of inflation was 110% in 1980.  
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period 1980-1988, the real exchange rate annually depreciated by 6% on average 
(Aşıkoglu and Uçtum, 1995; Civcir, 1996; Keyder, 2002). 
May 1981-December1999: Managed Float 
From May 1981 onward, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) 
announced  daily  quotations  to  nominal  exchange  rate  and  TL  depreciated 
continuously along with the inflation expectations. In August 1988, the central bank 
launched a new system to manage daily sessions for the interbank spot exchange 
market in which banks, financial institutions and licensed foreign exchange dealers 
were to join. On August 11, 1989, the decree No.32, the Protection of the Value of 
the Turkish Currency, issued which was associated with the convertibility of TL. By 
1990,  banks  were  allowed  to  determine  exchange  rates  in  their  operations. 
Eventually,  high  capital  inflows,  supported with high real interest rates, and the 
implicit usage of exchange rate as an anti-inflationary policy tool caused slowing 
down  the  continuous  depreciation  (Aşıkoğlu  and  Uçtum,  1995;  Keyder,  2002). 
During  early  1990s,  public  sector  borrowing  requirement  was  accelerating  and 
short-term  domestic  borrowing  was  used  to  finance  the  fiscal  deficits.  Beside  a 
significant real appreciation of TL for two consecutive years, that causes external 
deficit,  unsustainable  fiscal  balances,  debt-rollover  problem  and  monetization, 
increased the devaluation expectations by the end of 1993.
8 Eventually, structural 
imbalances were followed by a total devaluation of 173% in nominal terms between 
January 1994 and April 1994 (Berument and Dinçer, 2004).  
The financial crisis of 1994 slowed down with short-term monetary measures, 
very  high  interest  rates  and  excessive  reserve  losses,  and  eventually,  the  new 
stabilization program in April 5, 1994. Strengthening of the privatization process 
was the major structural change aimed by the program. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
loosening  of  the  monetary  policy  and  fiscal  austerity  caused  increase  in 
export/import  ratio  and  high  rates  of  growth.  Foreign  reserve  accumulation also 
realized. Post-crisis years, however, are characterized with depreciation of TL in 
nominal  terms,  high  rates  of  inflation,  increase  in  budget  deficit  and  the  global 
financial  crises  (the  Asian  and  Russian  crises)  leading  difficulty  in  foreign 
borrowing.  Moreover,  after  the  second  half  of  1997,  a  new  system  was  also 
introduced which would not allow the budget deficits to be financed by the central 
                                                            
8 The early years of the 1980 stabilization program is characterized by steep devaluations, monetized 
fiscal  deficits  and  financial  liberalization.  However,  the  inconsistency  between  fiscal  policy  and 
exchange rate policy started to be obvious in early 1990s (Aşıkoğlu and Uçtum, 1995).  
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bank. On the other hand, to stabilize the real exchange rate, the CBRT continued to 
depreciate the exchange rate in line with short-term inflation expectations, external 
imbalances and budget deficit until another stabilization programme in December 
1999 (Keyder, 2002; Berument and Dinçer, 2004). 
December 1999-February2001: Crawling Peg 
The  Exchange  Rate  Based  Stabilization  Programme,  or  2000  Disinflation 
Programme was embarked in December 1999 and focused on reducing the inflation 
rate to single digits at the end of 2002. This programme was fundamentally relied on 
fiscal  austerity,  nominally  anchored  exchange  rate  basket,  structural  reforms, 
privatization  and  income  policy.
9  Monetary  policy  has  no  active  role  since  TL 
would be issued only against the purchase of foreign exchange. The performance 
criteria of the monetary control were Net Domestic Assets and Net International 
Reserves shaped with a ceiling and floor, respectively (Keyder, 2002). Therefore, 
the  source  of  liquidity  generating  mechanism  was  the  short-term  capital  inflows 
which was the main weakness of the programme. 
Since the exchange rate policy was focused on forward-indexed inflation targets, 
the CBRT declared an exchange rate basket, 1 US$+0.77 €, which was based on 
announcements of daily depreciation rate for one-year period. By the end of 2000, 
the  percentage  change  in  TL  value  of  the  basket  would  be  fixed  at  20%,  the 
wholesale  price  index  inflation  target.  For  the  whole  period,  the  exchange  rate 
policy would consist of two different regimes. For the following first 18-months 
(January 2000-June 2001), the revaluation rate of the basket would be 20%, called 
as pre-announced crawling peg regime without a band. In the second 18-months, the 
band would be widening gradually and pre-announced crawling peg regime with a 
band would contribute to the smooth transition to free float.
10 In this context, the 
pre-announced  exchange  rate  was  essential  for  the  reduction  of  inflation 
expectations and the nominal interest rate, parallel to the decline in public sector 
borrowing requirement (Keyder, 2002).
11 
                                                            
9  The  structural  measures  fundamentally  cover  the  banking  sector  reform,  public  sector  budget, 
subsidization  and  income  support  to  the  agricultural  sector,  social  security  reform,  accelerated 
privatization, domestic debt management, budgetary funds and tax reform. 
10 The width of the band was 7.5% for the period July 2001-December 2001, 15% between January 
2002-June 2002 and finally, 22.5% for the period July 2002-December 2002. 
11  Conversely,  over  the  1990-1999  period,  exchange  rate  policy  was  implemented  parallel  to  the 
inflation expectations.  
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After  the  adoption  of  the  programme,  significant  improvement  in  inflation 
expectations lead to a fall in interest rates on Treasury bills, high capital inflows 
were realized, primary surplus was above targeted levels, public sector debt/GDP 
ratio declined and output growth was also realized. However, there were several 
factors make the financial system highly fragile, particularly an overvalued TL and 
current account deficit (5% in GDP), a high short-term external debt/reserves ratio 
(192%), capital inadequacy in financial sector, short positions in the banking sector 
(around $18 billion), duty loses of the state banks, bank balance-sheet weaknesses, 
including maturity and currency mismatches and dollarization.
12 In November 2000, 
runs on small-size banks triggered the banking crisis and sudden reversal of capital 
inflows, thereby causing rapid depletion of foreign reserves. On February 19, 2001 
political difficulties led to a more serious attack against TL. CBRT forced to sell 
approximately one-third of reserves, $7.5 billion, in one day and overnight interest 
rates skyrocketed to 2000% and 4000% on February 20 and 21, respectively. The 
devaluation rate reached to 40% in one week. Finally, the CBRT decided to float the 
TL on February 22 and depreciation continued until October 2001 (Selçuk, 2005). 
February 2001- : Free Float 
On  May  15,  2001  a  new  programme,  The  Programme  for  Strengthening  the 
Turkish  Economy,  was  initiated  which  relies  on  mainly  three  pillars:  1)  fiscal 
austerity, a strong primary surplus, 2) free floating regime and 3) structural reforms, 
particularly  restructuring  of  the  deeply  troubled  banking  sector,  massive  fiscal 
adjustment, public debt management and privatization.
13  
Under  the  new  exchange  rate  regime,  Base  Money  functioned  as  a  nominal 
anchor rather that the exchange rate anchor which was implemented only 14 months. 
Since  the  exchange  rate  stabilization  is  essential  for  the  price  stabilization, 
interventions to the foreign exchange market designed to prevent extreme volatility 
and to accumulate foreign reserves. In the context of financial stability and floating 
exchange rate regime, monetary policy expected to play a more active role. Hence, 
an amendment to the central bank law has been approved to give full operational 
independence as a key step in adopting an official inflation targeting regime. 
 
 
                                                            
12 In the pre-crisis period, dollarization was 52% of total deposits. 
13 The fiscal cost of banking crisis was 24% of GDP.  
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4. Data  
The data set consists of monthly values of the real exchange rate, inflation, output 
growth, foreign exchange reserves, volume of export and import and stock market 
index.
14 The data were taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the 
electronic  data  delivery  system  of  the  Central  Bank  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey 
(CBRT). Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the study.  
Table 2 
The Data Descriptions of the Macroeconomic Variables 
Variables  Period  Mean  Standard Deviation 
reer  1980:1-2006:3  119.60  19.90 
inf  1980:1-2006:2  0.03  0.02 
ip  1985:1-2006:1  84.51  21.02 
res  1981:1-2006:2  12354.70  12286.72 
exp  1980:1-2006:2  1796.87  1491.98 
imp  1980:1-2006:2  2847.18  2360.43 
ise  1986:1-2006:4  6118.43  9486.12 
Note: reer, inf, ip, res, exp, imp and ise represent CPI-based real effective exchange rate index, 
consumer  price  index,  industrial  production  index,  Central  Bank’s  gross  foreign  exchange 
reserves,  volume  of  export,  volume  of  import  and  the  closing  price  index  of  Istanbul  Stock 
Exchange, National-100 (January, 1986=1), respectively. 
Many  macroeconomic  time  series  contain  unit  roots  dominated  by  stochastic 
trends.  Unit  roots  are  important  in  examining  the  stationarity  of  a  time  series 
because a non-stationary regressor invalidates many standard empirical results. The 
presence of a stochastic trend is determined by testing the presence of unit roots in 
time series data. In this study, Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) tests have been 
used to test for unit root. Logarithmic differences are taken of the macroeconomic 
variables.  Table  3  reports  the  unit  root  test  results  for  the  level  and  the  first 
difference of the variables. Table 3 presents results for the seven time series. The 
results  indicate  that  we  cannot  reject  stationarity  for  the  first  differences  of  the 
variables. Thus, all time series are I(1).  
                                                            
14 The variables selected do not exhaust all the macroeconomic variables. Those selected, however, have 
been chosen in most of the studies in the literature and considered as the most important macroeconomic 
variables that have been affected from the exchange rate regimes. We include real exchange rate in our 
study because the significant shifts in the nominal exchange rate are associated with the changes in 
exchange rate regimes. Real exchange rate explicitly includes this change and is the most important 
variable used in almost all related studies. We consider the rate of inflation and industrial production, 
since the variability of nominal exchange rate directly affects them, in particularly developing countries. 
Foreign exchange reserves are also closely related with the exchange rates shifts. Similarly, the trade 
variables can easily affected from the exchange rate variability.  
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Table 3 
Unit Root Test: ADF 
  Level  First Difference 
  Trend  No Trend  Trend  No Trend 
lreer  -2.267 (3)  -2.419 (2)  -9.032 (4)  -8.893 (4) 
linf  -2.007 (12)  -1.973 (12)  -7.867 (11)  -7.854 (11) 
lip  -2.699 (12)  -1.022 (12)  -4.891 (12)  -4.881 (12) 
lres  -3.155 (1)  -0.112 (0)  -16.451 (0)  -16.464 (0) 
lexp  -2.559 (12)  -0.530 (12)  -5.115 (12)  -5.123 (12) 
limp  -3.306 (12)  0.305 (12)  -6.160 (11)  -5.213 (12) 
lise  -2.471 (3)  -1.384 (3)  -7.703 (2)  -7.648 (2) 
Note: lreer, lip, lres, lexp, limp and lise represent natural logarithm of reel exchange rate, industrial 
production index, foreign exchange reserves, volume of export and import and stock market index, 
respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are optimum number of lags determined according to AIC and 
critical values are based on (MacKinnon, 1991); critical values are  -3.50 (99%) and -4.056 (99%) with 
no trend and with trend, respectively. 
5. Conditional Volatility Models and Estimation 
Model 
The  time-varying  volatility  is  conventionally  estimated  by  Generalized 
Autoregressive  Conditional  Heteroscedasticity  (GARCH)  models  which  are  the 
generalized version of ARCH model. Engle (1982) introduced the ARCH model to 
capture  the  time-varying  risk,  which  allows  us  to  estimate  the  time-varying 
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where  t ε  represents the disturbance terms that are normally distributed. GARCH 
model  is  the  extension  of  ARCH  models  by  including  lagged  values  of  the 
conditional variance. Bollerslev (1986) specified conditional variance and denoted 
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The  GARCH  specification  requires  that                                    be  less  than 
one to satisfy the stationary condition and  0 α , i α , j β  be positive for non-negativity 
condition.  These  models employ volatility clustering which helps to provide the 
magnitude but not the sign of the random shocks. 
In this study, the monthly conditional volatility of the macroeconomic variables 
is estimated using the following GARCH model:   
 
 

















i t CR h h   (3) 
where CR is dummy for crises of 1994 and 2001.
15 Since the Turkish economy 
experienced two major financial crises in recent years, we take the effects of crises 
on the macroeconomic variables in order to accurately estimate the volatility series.  
Estimation Results 
Since several empirical studies indicate that GARCH (1,1) model adequately fits 
many economic time series, initially such models were estimated for all series. If the 
likelihood-ratio test indicated a better fit for a GARCH (p, q) model with a higher p, 
new models with higher p values were estimated until no significant improvement in 
the  fit  could  be  detected.  Finally,  from  the  estimated  variance  equation  of  the 
GARCH model, conditional volatility forecasts could be obtained. These forecasts, 
transformed into standard deviation form, will be used as our conditional GARCH 
volatilities in the analysis further on.  
After  testing  the  null  of  no  GARCH  effect  in  the  standardized  errors, 
GARCH(1,1) process is estimated only for real exchange rate, inflation, reserves 
and import series. Table 4 presents the results of the modelling of macroeconomic 
volatility.  The  GARCH  parameter,  1 β ,  is  significantly  greater  than  the  ARCH 
parameter,  1 α , (a strong GARCH effect) in the volatility models of real exchange 
rate, inflation and reserves, implying that these volatilities are influenced by random 
shocks  for  long-periods.  In  other  words,  the  effects  of  random  shocks  on  real 
exchange rate, inflation and reserve volatility are more persistent. Moreover, the 
ARCH  and  GARCH  parameters  are  between  zero  and  one  indicating  positive 
variance and sum of the parameters fairly close to unity for inflation and reserves. 
There appears to be no significant distinction between the effects of short and long-
period shocks on import. We could only find ARCH effect for industrial production, 
export and stock market index showing that these volatility series are affected by 




                                                            








Estimated Volatility Models  
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0.786  671.770  -4.246 






0.937  764.525  -4.853 




-  0.424  280.959  -2.198 






0.972  298.565  -1.950 




-  0.478  153.648  -0.956 






0.667  106.061  -0.645 




-  0.327  145.102  -1.161 
Note: reer, ip, res, exp, imp and ise represent the real exchange rate, industrial production index, foreign 
exchange  reserves,  volume  of  export  and  import,  stock  market  index,  respectively.  Numbers  in 
parenthesis denote p-values of the related coefficients. 
 
The  estimated  volatility  patterns  for  all  fundamental  variables  are  plotted  in 
Figure 1. As expectedly, there have been distinct periods of high volatility in most 
of the macroeconomic variables corresponding to financial crises of 1994 and 2001. 
The volatility of almost all variables is high during the crawling band regime of 
early 1980s. While there seems to be lower volatility of real exchange rate and 
inflation during the long period of managed float regime. The adoption of crawling 
peg regime in December 1999 leads to a higher volatility in import and stock market 
index and lower volatility in export. Moving from crawling peg to floating regime 
after the financial crisis of February 2001, however, causes a significant increase in 
the volatility of real exchange rate, inflation, foreign exchange reserves and stock 
market index at a decreasing rate. Moreover, the volatility of industrial production, 
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Some summary statistics of estimated volatility models in the context of  “de 
jure” and “de facto” classifications are presented in Table 5 and 6. Most of the 
series  exhibit  excess  kurtosis  and  skewed  behavior  which  are  the  signs  of 
leptokurtotic  distributions.
16  Our  results  indicate  that  the  real  exchange  rate, 
inflation, export and stock market index present excess kurtosis, under managed 
float. Surprisingly, the highest mean variances exist in crawling band and crawling 
peg regimes under “de jure” and “de facto” classifications, respectively. 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics of Estimated Volatility Models: “De Jure” Classification 
Crawling Band (1980:1-1981:4) 
  Reer(1,1)  Inf(1,1)   Ip(1,0)  Res(1,1)  Exp(1,0)  Imp(1,1)  Ise(1,0) 
Mean  80.159  39.877    n.a.  162.522  267.861  917.116    n.a. 
Std.dev  99.177  22.845    n.a.  6.541  158.965  484.145    n.a. 
Skew.  1.393  0.348    n.a.  -0.784  1.710  0.460    n.a. 
Kurt.  0.768  -1.464    n.a.     n.a.  2.218  -0.978    n.a. 
 
Managed Float (1981:5-1999:11) 
  Reer(1,1)  Inf(1,1)   Ip(1,0)  Res(1,1)  Exp(1,0)  Imp(1,1)  Ise(1,0) 
Mean  9.991  7.229  73.532  117.136  272.932  329.099  207.617 
Std.dev.  20.947  12.883  45.126  77.994  225.553  192.562  161.024 
Skew.  6.039  5.659  2.893  1.332  4.636  2.577  4.589 
Kurt.  39.712  35.448  11.756  1.511  32.018  7.576  29.069 
 
Crawling Peg (1999:12-2001:2) 
  Reer(1,1)  Inf(1,1)   Ip(1,0)  Res(1,1)  Exp(1,0)  Imp(1,1)  Ise(1,0) 
Mean  18.548  5.484  62.881  59.912  153.741  252.994  305.955 
Std.dev.  25.721  6.656  38.249  72.117  49.866  108.430  185.393 
Skew.  1.461  1.585  2.160  1.734  0.154  2.205  1.113 
Kurt.  0.496  1.073  3.551  1.492  0.727  4.778  0.479 
 
Free Float (2001:2-  ) 
  Reer(1,1)  Inf(1,1)   Ip(1,0)  Res(1,1)  Exp(1,0)  Imp(1,1)  Ise(1,0) 
Mean  23.387  5.034  65.433  74.279  221.029  277.787  167.879 
Std.dev.  32.018  7.329  43.395  79.836  135.131  154.978  74.399 
Skew.  2.741  2.334  2.989  1.700  2.651  2.477  2.254 
Kurt.  7.667  4.599  8.794  1.611  8.117  6.343  4.581 
Note:  Reer(1,1),  Inf(1,1),  Ip(1,0),  Res(1,1),  Exp(1,0),  Imp(1,1)  and  Ise(1,0)  implies  the  calculated 
GARCH(p,q) specification for each variable.   
 
 
                                                            
16 Normal distribution has skewness of zero and kurtosis of three.  
 
 




Descriptive Statistics of Estimated Volatility Models: “De Facto” Classification 
Crawling Peg (1980:1-1981:3) 
  Reer(1,1)  Inf(1,1)   Ip(1,0)  Res(1,1)  Exp(1,0)  Imp(1,1)  Ise(1,0) 
Mean  85.389  41.481  n.a  166.047  276.479  952.556  n.a 
Std.dev.  100.751  22.814  n.a  3.318  161.288  481.807  n.a 
Skew.  1.299  0.219  n.a  n.a  1.633  0.348  n.a 
Kurt.  0.476  -1.506  n.a  n.a  1.909  -1.001  n.a 
 
Managed Float (1981:4-1998:1) 
  Reer(1,1)  Inf(1,1)   Ip(1,0)  Res(1,1)  Exp(1,0)  Imp(1,1)  Ise(1,0) 
Mean  10.623  7.825  73.563  125.165  277.010  323.529  210.483 
Std.dev.  21.917  13.442  46.120  77.942  235.073  180.331  167.009 
Skew.  5.743  5.381  3.012  1.259  4.476  2.636  4.593 
Kurt.  35.779  31.934  12.327  1.317  29.544  8.240  28.526 
 
Crawling Peg around DM (1998:2-1998:12) 
  Reer(1,1)  Inf(1,1)   Ip(1,0)  Res(1,1)  Exp(1,0)  Imp(1,1)  Ise(1,0) 
Mean  4.286  2.487  80.727  54.662  231.979  342.454  223.094 
Std.dev.  0.439  0.611  46.435  10.751  109.538  239.698  153.357 
Skew.  0.631  0.756  0.878  0.611  1.552  2.104  2.199 
Kurt.  -0.864  1.028  -1.100  -0.449  1.545  4.468  4.725 
 
Crawling Peg around € (1999:1-2001:1) 
  Reer(1,1)  Inf(1,1)   Ip(1,0)  Res(1,1)  Exp(1,0)  Imp(1,1)  Ise(1,0) 
Mean  9.858  3.324  64.755  42.599  187.527  330.837  236.330 
Std.dev.  16.742  4.134  34.321  43.262  65.697  237.982  161.496 
Skew.  2.807  2.929  1.858  3.117  0.553  2.705  1.922 
Kurt.  6.944  7.989  2.524  9.477  1.097  8.693  3.240 
 
Free Float (2001:2-  ) 
  Reer(1,1)  Inf(1,1)   Ip(1,0)  Res(1,1)  Exp(1,0)  Imp(1,1)  Ise(1,0) 
Mean  23.387  5.034  65.433  74.279  221.029  277.787  167.879 
Std.dev.  32.018  7.329  43.395  79.836  135.131  154.978  74.399 
Skew.  2.741  2.334  2.989  1.700  2.651  2.477  2.254 
Kurt.  7.667  4.599  8.794  1.611  8.117  6.343  4.581 
Note:  Reer(1,1),  Inf(1,1),  Ip(1,0),  Res(1,1),  Exp(1,0),  Imp(1,1)  and  Ise(1,0)  implies  the  calculated 
GARCH(p,q) specification for each variable.   
6. The Relationships Between Macroeconomic Volatility and Exchange Rate 
Regimes  
To examine whether the impact of exchange rate regimes on the volatility of 
macroeconomic variables is similar in both “de jure” and “de facto” classifications, 
we use t-test. A t-test is a statistical tool used to determine whether a significant 
difference exists between the means of two series.  
The hypothesis is: 
  0 : 2 1 0 = µ − µ reg reg H  
  0 : 2 1 1 > µ − µ reg reg H   
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If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, it implies that the variations in the mean 
of  fundamental  variables  are  the  same  under  alternative  exchange  rate  regimes. 
Therefore, the linked exchange rate regimes are not statistically different from each 
other.  
Table 7 and 8 summarize the results of the t-tests. Under “de jure” classification, 
the variations in the mean of real exchange rate volatility across two regimes are the 
same,  particularly  in  the  crawling  band  regime.  Similarly,  out  of  six  pairs  of 
regimes, only two of them indicate that the change in mean of volatility of inflation 
and foreign exchange reserves across two regimes is not statistically different from 
each other. Hence, the volatility of inflation and foreign exchange reserves displays 
different  behavior  across  different  regimes.  The  volatility  of  the  industrial 
production, however, seems to be insensitive to regime changes, since the means of 
two regimes are the same in any pair. The variations in the mean of the import 
volatility across two regimes are different from each other in almost all cases while 
for the export volatility, the findings indicate different means only for the three 
cases. The means of the stock market index volatility between two regimes are same 
only  one  case,  indicating  that  the  stock  market  volatility  is  more  sensitive  to 
exchange rate regime changes.  
Under “de facto” classification, the variations in the mean of the volatility of real 
exchange rate, inflation and industrial production, export and stock market indices 
are almost the same across two regimes. These findings indicate the insensitiveness 
of  the  volatility  of  key  macroeconomic  variables  toward  different  regimes.  The 
mean  of  the  volatility  of  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  import,  however,  show 
different behavior across regimes. Overall, the volatility of inflation, import, foreign 
exchange reserves and stock market index are sensitive to de jure regime changes. 
However,  the  volatility  of  import  and  foreign  exchange  reserves  are  weakly 
sensitive to de facto regime changes. Therefore, “de facto” regimes are more neutral 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of exchange rate regimes on 
the volatility of fundamental variables in the context of “de jure” and “de facto” 
classifications for the period 1980-2006 in Turkey. In this respect, the empirical 
results suggest that there is a persistency of shocks in real exchange rate, inflation 
and foreign exchange reserve series, a strong GARCH effect. Even though managed 
float regime indicates the highest risk for most of the macroeconomic series in both 
“de jure” and “de facto” classifications, there is a little evidence on the statistically 
significant  difference  between  the  exchange  rate  regimes,  particularly  under  “de 
facto” classification. As the variation in the mean of the most of the variables is not 
sensitive to exchange rate regime changes, macroeconomic variables exhibit similar 
volatilities  across  alternative  exchange  rate  regimes.  Overall,  “de  facto”  regime 
neutrality  is  stronger  than  “de  jure”  regime  neutrality.  With  respect  to  regime 
neutrality, our findings are similar to the findings of Baxter and Stockman (1989), 
Flood and Rose (1995) and Singh (2002).  
The  monetary  authority  adopts  exchange  rate  policy  to  pursue  the 
macroeconomic stability, to break the inflation inertia, to gain credibility or to cope 
with  serious  speculative  attacks.  The  findings  of  this  study  indicate  that  regime 
commitment may be more effective on the volatility of inflation, import, foreign 
exchange reserves and stock market index, since these are more sensitive to de jure 
regime changes. However, the volatility of import and foreign exchange reserves are 
strongly influenced by the actual or “de facto” regime changes. Since volatility of 
imports and foreign exchange reserves show sensitivity in both “de jure” and “de 
facto”  regime  changes,  the  monetary  authority  needs  to  advocate  a  particular 
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